



---

## SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

---

CRISIS



**Table of Contents**

Letter from The Chair ..... 4

Letter from Crisis Director ..... 5

Introduction of the Conflict ..... 7

Current Situation..... 10

Geographical and Historical Background..... 11

Definitions of Maritime Zones and Related Terms..... 14

    Two Condition of Sailing ..... 14

        Innocent passage ..... 14

        Freedom of navigation..... 14

Maritime Zones..... 15

    Territorial sea (TS)..... 15

    Contiguous zone (CZ) ..... 15

    Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) ..... 16

    Continental shelf (CS)..... 16

Points of Dispute..... 17

    The Nine-Dash Line ..... 17

    “Island” or “Rock”; Definition of Islands That Can Claim EEZ..... 17

    Overlapping of Maritime Zones Claims ..... 19

    Construction of Artificial Islands and Militarization ..... 19

Maritime Resources ..... 20



## 2022 Vanier Model UN Conference

International Concerns .....	21
Trade Route.....	21
The South China Sea Arbitration Filed by the Philippines against China.....	23
Overview .....	23
China’s reaction .....	24
The Philippines’ reaction.....	24
Questions to Consider.....	25
Country Descriptions .....	26
Claimant Countries:.....	26
China .....	26
The Philippines.....	27
Vietnam.....	28
Indonesia.....	28
Taiwan.....	29
Malaysia .....	30
Brunei.....	31
Non-Claimant Countries: .....	31
Japan .....	31
South Korea.....	32
The United States of America .....	32
Russia .....	33



## South China Sea Dispute

Canada .....	33
Australia .....	33
Thailand.....	34
India .....	34
<i>Bibliography</i> .....	35



## Letter from The Chair

Hello Delegates,

My name is Zachary Rynbends, I am a second year Health Science student at Dawson College, and I will be your chair for this committee. I am joined by vice-chair Momoka Takami, a first-year Social Science - International Studies major at Vanier.

The topic of the South China Sea Dispute is an interesting one. It is one of the major ongoing conflicts in the world, but it was one that I felt I had the least amount of knowledge about. Throughout the process of preparing for this conference, we all learned a lot about the dispute itself and began to truly understand what the conflict was about. With each passing day, we became more excited to see this come to fruition.

After many months of working towards this, we are all excited to see what delegates do with this crisis. We know firsthand that there is a very large collaborative spirit in Model UN, but also a very competitive one, so we are all looking forward to seeing how this dispute gets dealt with. No matter how delegates decide to pursue this crisis, we are certain that this will be a great committee for all those who attend!

We are looking forward to seeing you all at this year's VMUN!

Zachary Rynbend, Chair

Momoka Takami, Vice-Chair



## Letter from Crisis Director

Hello, delegates,

My name is Ariel Keren, I am a third-year Pure and Applied Science student at Vanier and I shall be your crisis director for this committee. Alongside me is my well versed assistant crisis director, Carmel Moran, a second-year Music and Science Double DSC student at Vanier as well.

Land struggles and territory disputes have evolved through the years. It used to be viable to outright go to war with a neighbouring country to gain land control, to ease commerce within your empire or dynasty. With the globalization of the world's industries, wars for land became few and far between. This is why this topic spiked my interest. The South China Sea dispute is one of the biggest territorial disputes that is still a point of tension in the world. Not only does this dispute involve several countries within the region, but as stated before, due to the globalization of industries other countries, such as the United States and Canada, have a say in the matter. This will be no easy task for you and your fellow delegates, historical claims jumbled with current day politics and global commerce will make this a complex and intriguing crisis to work your way through. Although this conflict is complex, I feel confident that my team and I can bring this crisis to you so that you can strive to find a solution with your fellow delegates to put an end to this long lasting stalemate. It will be up to the individual on how they want to tackle the way to solving this conflict: will it be through pleasantries and global understanding, or through countries' self-interests carving up land to secure prosperity for a said nation? My team and I are eager to see what interesting solutions you come up with, making sure that every step of the way we keep the crisis lively and interesting.



2022 Vanier Model UN Conference

Looking forward to seeing you all.

Ariel Keren, Crisis Director

Carmel Moran, Assistant Crisis Director



*“Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.”*  
*-Hugo Grotius*

---

## **Introduction of the Conflict**

Since the 1970s, countries around the South China Sea (SCS) have set claims over various land features and maritime zones. These claims almost always overlap with claims of other countries, causing tensions. The most fervent claimer in this sea is China, as it is the only country whose claim encompasses almost the entire area. Because of this extravagant claim and the fact that China keeps patrolling the sea with military vessels and keeps disturbing activity of other countries in the sea, the bulk of the tensions from this dispute lie specifically between China and the other countries. For multiple countries, the SCS's islands represent strategic places to establish military bases outside their mainland. Additionally, the SCS is very important for the economy of many countries coasting it, as it is rich with oil and natural gas reserves, and fish. The SCS also represents an important maritime trade route both for the economies of the nations next to this sea, as well as for countries all over the globe: an estimated \$3.4 trillion passes through the region each year. Thus, a lot of countries all over the world have an interest in keeping the region neutral and peaceful. According to the United Nations International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a country is granted a 200 nautical-mile exclusive economic zone from its coast. Because almost all of the countries involved in the dispute respect the rules of the UNCLOS, this is a big reason why they tend to want to claim islands or land features: claiming a single island is enough to grant a country a circular maritime territory of 200 nautical-miles radii! China is the only one whose claim does not respect the UNCLOS, despite being a signatory of it. This conflict





is complicated by the fact that many countries involved in it are strongly dependent on China economically, and lack in general the resources to stand up against this big country, and so most tend to avoid expressing their frustration with China's assertiveness in the region. The two biggest exceptions are the Philippines and Vietnam, which openly criticize China's actions. While countries could group to form a bigger resistance to China, not all of them are interested in doing such. Most rely on international law and negotiation to try to resolve the dispute in a peaceful and fairway.



## South China Sea Dispute




Figure 1: Map from 2016 Showing the Different Regions Claimed by Countries<sup>1</sup>

(Indonesia is missing from the map, whose claim is on the Nathan Islands, located between East and West Malaysia. Taiwan also claims Taiping Island.)

<sup>1</sup> WSJ com News Graphics, "The South China Sea Dispute," The Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2016, <http://graphics.wsj.com/south-china-sea-dispute/>.

## Current Situation

This committee takes place on the weekend of April 23rd and 24th, 2022.

At present, tensions in the region have decreased somewhat. Relations between China, the Philippines, and Vietnam, with regards to the sea, have improved. In spite of this, there are still high tensions.<sup>2</sup> With an election coming up in the Philippines in May, some candidates have expressed interest in increasing military action in the region.<sup>3</sup>

Foreign powers, like the United States and Australia, have been implicated in the situation as well. With Australia being in the vicinity of the South China Sea, it has received residual effects of the conflict. With China being defensive over its territorial claims, it shone a military grade laser from one of its vessels at an Australian aircraft near Australia's exclusive economic zone.<sup>4</sup>

The United States has also been prominent in the conflict. In January 2022, a US aircraft, full of classified technology, crashed into the South China Sea, which kicked off a race to locate it.<sup>5</sup> The technology inside could both leak intelligence to China, a country with complex relations with America, and it could help them better understand American warfare tactics and technology. As recently as November 2021, China has been replicating American military

---

<sup>2</sup> "Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea | Global Conflict Tracker." 2022. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea>.

<sup>3</sup> "Philippines' Marcos Jr Wants Military Presence to 'Defend' South China Sea." South China Morning Post, February 15, 2022. <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/3167178/philippines-marcos-jnr-wants-military-presence-defend-south-china-sea>.

<sup>4</sup> Blaxland, John. "What Happened When a Chinese Ship Shone a Laser at an Australian Plane – and Why Does It Matter?" The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, February 21, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/feb/21/what-happened-when-a-chinese-ship-shone-a-laser-at-an-australian-plane-and-why-does-it-matter>.

<sup>5</sup> Borger, Julian. "Race to Salvage US F-35C Fighter Jet That Crashed in Hostile South China Sea." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, January 28, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/28/f-35c-crash-leaves-us-fighter-jet-sunken-in-hostile-south-china-sea>.



technology.<sup>6</sup> This is all part of China's efforts to improve their military in order to militarily assert their claims in the sea.

Currently, the main issues remain the land claims of the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Delegates must decide how to handle all countries' claims to existing land in the region while balancing the creation of new land to claims.

### Geographical and Historical Background

The South China Sea has always been an important resource for the people in the area. For a large part of history, it was used primarily for fishing. There exists documentation of Chinese fishermen using these waters since the 3rd-century CE.<sup>7</sup> However, many of the other valuable resources in the area were not known about or were not widely used until the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, explaining the acceleration in the conflict in the past decades.

The South China Sea is an area of approximately 3.5 million square kilometres.<sup>8</sup> Annually, over \$3 trillion of international trade passes through these waters, including 40% of the total global gas trade.<sup>9</sup> The area is also rapidly increasing in size. With all nations attempting to claim

---

<sup>6</sup> "Satellite Images Show China Has Built Mock-Ups of US Warships." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, November 8, 2021. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/08/satellite-images-china-mock-ups-us-warships>.

<sup>7</sup> Zhiguo Gao, and Bing Bing Jia. "The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications." *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 107, no. 1, [American Society of International Law, Cambridge University Press], 2013, pp. 98–124, <https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.1.0098>.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.



exclusive control over the region, new land has been constructed in the form of man-made islands to further the claims of all participants. China alone has added over 3,200 acres of land.<sup>10</sup>

Some of the more significant landmasses in the area include the Paracel Islands, the Pratas Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the Zhongsha Islands. These areas have consistently been a good source of fish and in recent years have become an area with lots of potential to be a major source of natural gas and oil.<sup>11</sup>

For much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, there has been some conflict and disagreement related to territorial claims in the South China Sea. In 1914, the government of China employed several cartographers to define China's area of control in the ocean. By 1935, these borders were further expanded and encompassed more land area.<sup>12</sup>

In 1947, the Chinese government began using a map featuring an eleven-dash line. This line outlined a big chunk of the SCS which China considered and still considers, as its own naval territory.<sup>13</sup> In 1953, this line would eventually become the nine-dash line, which remains one of the main points of conflict in the present day.

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.



## South China Sea Dispute



Figure 2: Map of China's Nine-Dash Line

In 1949, the Philippines gained their independence and began providing opposition to China's command over the region. They argued that they should have control over some of the Spratly Islands as they are geographically much closer. The Chinese government circulated a statement in 1956 that these islands are in fact Chinese and denied the Philippines' claim.<sup>14</sup> In the 1960s, these tensions began to rise. Vietnam and China fought over the Paracel Islands in the 1970s and continued to do so into the 2000s. Malaysia made several claims to the Spratly Islands. In 2010, Indonesia opposed China's claims over the entire sea.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Zhiguo Gao, and Bing Bing Jia. "The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications." *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 107, no. 1, [American Society of International Law, Cambridge University Press], 2013, pp. 98–124, <https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.1.0098>.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

## Definitions of Maritime Zones and Related Terms

### Two Condition of Sailing

#### *Innocent passage*<sup>16</sup>

---

*“Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”<sup>17</sup>*

---

- Territorial sea (UNCLOS Article 17)
- Internal waters (UNCLOS Article 8): waters located outside of the territorial sea
- Archipelagic waters (UNCLOS Article 52)
- The use of the innocent passage is based on the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the state that corresponds to the listed areas above.

#### *Freedom of navigation*<sup>18</sup>

- International waters: Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (UNCLOS Article
- Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) is applied when one state challenges the claim made by the state of EEZ; the U.S. military actions against China in the South China Sea

---

<sup>16</sup> Christine Elizabeth Macaraig and Adam James Fenton, “Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation,” *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 8, no. 2 (2021): 42–58, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340>, 50

<sup>17</sup> “UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION on the LAW of the SEA,” Un.org, 2020, [https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm](https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid



## Maritime Zones

---

“The maritime zones recognized under international law include internal waters, the territorial sea (TS), the contiguous zone (CZ), the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the continental shelf (CS), the high seas and the Area.”<sup>19</sup>

---

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that a state that owns territorial sovereignty over an island or a mainland can claim TS, EEZ and CS.<sup>20</sup>

### ***Territorial sea (TS)***<sup>21</sup>

- 12 nautical miles (nm) (22km) from each coastal State’s shore
- Sovereignty over the waters, seabed, subsoil, airspace
- Foreign ships have a right of innocent passage within the territorial sea which is limited to transit (excluding submerged submarines and aircraft)
- No fishing is allowed

### ***Contiguous zone (CZ)***<sup>22</sup>

- 6 to 12nm (11 to 22km) beyond the territorial sea
- One of the purposes is the extension of the state’s sanitary regulations to the sea to prevent contagious diseases from entering the land

---

<sup>19</sup> “Maritime Zone | InforMEA,” [www.informea.org](http://www.informea.org), n.d., <https://www.informea.org/en/terms/maritime-zone>.

<sup>20</sup> Xuechan Ma, “The South China Sea Dispute: Perspective of International Law,” *Atlantisch Perspectief* 40, no. 3 (2016): 39–41, <https://doi.org/10.2307/48581297>, 39.

<sup>21</sup> The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Territorial Waters | International Law | Britannica,” in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/territorial-waters>.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid





### **Exclusive economic zone (EEZ)<sup>23</sup>**

- within the 200nm (370km) measured from each coastal State's shore
- It is an international water
- The exploitation and regulations of fisheries, scientific research, construction of artificial islands are allowed

### **Continental shelf (CS)<sup>24</sup>**

- Up to 200nm in depth from the coast of each State
- The state has the right to explore and exploit natural resources such as the oil and gas in the seabed




Figure 3: Illustration of Maritime Zone

<sup>23</sup> R. R. Churchill, "Law of the Sea | International Law [1982] | Britannica," in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, February 7, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Law-of-the-Sea>.

<sup>24</sup> The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Continental Shelf | Geology," in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, February 3, 2012, <https://www.britannica.com/science/continental-shelf>.

## Points of Dispute

### The Nine-Dash Line

China claims most of the area in the South China Sea within the Nine-Dash Line which is based on the national document from about 70 years ago.<sup>25</sup> It consists of more than 85% of the total surface, which overlaps with every claim from other countries.<sup>26</sup> China has taken advantage of UNCLOS not having jurisdiction over a historical background of sovereignty and justified sovereignty of islands located within the line.<sup>27</sup> On the contrary, UNCLOS states that China's claim of the Nine-Dash Line is not following its laws and overlaps with other states that claim the territory legitimately.<sup>28</sup> Acknowledging China's "historical right" can allow other countries to claim territories that used to be a part of the kingdoms and empires.<sup>29</sup>

### "Island" or "Rock"; Definition of Islands That Can Claim EEZ

According to UNCLOS, the definition of an "island" is "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," and it also stated that "rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic

---

<sup>25</sup> Christine Elizabeth Macaraig and Adam James Fenton, "Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation," *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 8, no. 2 (2021): 42–58, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340>, 44

<sup>26</sup> Maximo Paulino T. Sison, "Universalizing the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea Dispute," *Ocean Development & International Law* 49, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 157–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2018.1442181>, 158.

<sup>27</sup> Christine Elizabeth Macaraig and Adam James Fenton, "Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation," *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 8, no. 2 (2021): 42–58, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340>, 44

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 47

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*



zone or continental shelf.”<sup>30</sup> Therefore, China’s construction of artificial islands around “islands” , which purpose is to keep them above the water at all times, within the South China Sea does not support their claim of the extension of EEZ.<sup>31</sup>

There are many international disputes on whether Archipelagos in the South China Sea is considered an island that could justify a claim of EEZ made by a state.

The only official conclusion regarding this discussion had determined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 on the matter of the South China Sea Attribution between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China.<sup>32</sup> The Tribunal stated that “all of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands (including, for example, Itu Aba, Thitu, West York Island, Spratly Island, North-East Cay, South-West Cay) are legally”rocks” that do not generate an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”<sup>33</sup> The details of the Arbitration follows in a later section.

---

<sup>30</sup> “PREAMBLE to the UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION on the LAW of the SEA,” [www.un.org](http://www.un.org), accessed March 9, 2022, [https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm).

<sup>31</sup> Christine Elizabeth Macaraig and Adam James Fenton, “Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation,” *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 8, no. 2 (2021): 42–58, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340>, 49

<sup>32</sup> “PRESS RELEASE the SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION (the REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES v. the PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC of CHINA)” (Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 2016), <https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf>.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*



## Overlapping of Maritime Zones Claims

The Spratlys Islands area<sup>34</sup>

- China: sovereignty, EEZ, CS from the islands (based on the understanding that the Spratlys Islands historically belong to China)
- Vietnam: sovereignty, EEZ, CS from the main island
- Malaysia: small islands in the southern area of the Spratlys Islands, EEZ, CS from its mainland

These claims are overlapping each other, although there are differences in where to set the claims for EEZ and CS.<sup>35</sup>

## Construction of Artificial Islands and Militarization

In recent years, China has strengthened its influence in the South China Sea by constructing artificial islands in the area, specifically the Spratly island based on the recognition that these islands belong to the state. There are two main goals in doing so: to extend the claim of EEZ and have a militarization base.<sup>36</sup> China intends to reinforce national defence in response to the United States' tightening its relationships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, and Brunei.<sup>37</sup> Several reports stated that the artificial islands hold runways for aircraft to land,

---

<sup>34</sup> Xuechan Ma, "The South China Sea Dispute: Perspective of International Law," *Atlantisch Perspectief* 40, no. 3 (2016): 39–41, <https://doi.org/10.2307/48581297>, 40.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 40

<sup>36</sup> Aaron Van, "Artificial Islands in South China Sea," ArcGIS StoryMaps, December 9, 2020, <https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/6d8a684e762f4f4ca90c1a19121fcf8c>.

<sup>37</sup> Major Almannai Faesal, "WHY CHINA BUILT in the SOUTH CHINA SEA," May 2019, <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/308/305/almannai.pdf>. 5, 6.



radars, buildings that might include military facilities, and installations of missiles.<sup>38</sup> The claim over these natural islands that are now being converted into artificial islands overlaps with the claims from the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan.<sup>39</sup>

### **Maritime Resources**

Controlling over resources had always been the source of conflict of the states and the South China Sea Dispute is one of them. Whoever dominates the area can gain vast amounts of natural resources that could enrich the state's economy and boost its position in international society. The estimation says, in the South China Sea, there are "11 billion barrels of oil, 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 16.6 million tons of fish for a yearly catch, and 3,365 known species of fish."<sup>40</sup> China has a strong desire of gaining new energy sources, which led them to have their own estimation of oil, 130 billion barrels.<sup>41</sup> This is bigger compared to the general estimation, which is why they disparity trying to dominate the South China Sea. Claiming EEZ is the key to having a right to exploit the oil and maritime resources.

---

<sup>38</sup> Aaron Van, "Artificial Islands in South China Sea," ArcGIS StoryMaps, December 9, 2020, <https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/6d8a684e762f4f4ca90c1a19121fcf8c>.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid

<sup>40</sup> Christine Elizabeth Macaraig and Adam James Fenton, "Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation," *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 8, no. 2 (2021): 42–58, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340>, 43

<sup>41</sup> Ibid



## International Concerns

### Trade Route

Throughout the year, an estimated \$11.3 billion worth of the world's goods pass through the SCS, which accounts for about 30% of the total world trade.<sup>42</sup> The SCS is also used for the global transportation of crude oil, as it accounts for more than 30% of the world's crude oil trade.<sup>43</sup> The SCS is extremely important for the economy of Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam.<sup>44</sup> The Strait of Malacca, located between Malaysia and the Sumatra island of Indonesia, represents a vital waterway that connects the Indonesian Ocean and the South China Sea.<sup>45</sup>

If a state gains sovereignty over an area in the South China Sea, the state of the water becomes EEZ, which provides multiple benefits to the country, including the right of the exploitation of resources. On the other hand, states that rely on their economical activity on fishly in the area might suffer from regulations of fishing that decrease their income.

---

<sup>42</sup> Christine Elizabeth Macaraig and Adam James Fenton, "Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation," *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 8, no. 2 (2021): 42–58, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340>, 46

<sup>43</sup> Ibid

<sup>44</sup> Christine Elizabeth Macaraig and Adam James Fenton, "Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation," *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 8, no. 2 (2021): 42–58, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340>, 46

<sup>45</sup> The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Strait of Malacca | Strait, Asia | Britannica," in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, June 20, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Strait-of-Malacca>.



**Major crude oil trade flows in the South China Sea (2016)**  
million barrels per day




Figure 4: "Major crude oil trade flows in the South China Sea (2016)"



## The South China Sea Arbitration Filed by the Philippines against China

### Overview

In January 2013, the Republic of the Philippines filed an official claim about the South China Sea dispute against the People’s Republic of China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague, Netherlands.<sup>46</sup> The claim mainly included three matters: non-legitimacy in “historical rights” to claim a territory within the Nine-Dash Line, an objection in claiming EEZ and CS from “islands” in the South China Sea that are legally rocks, and unlawful claim of sovereignty by China overlapping with the Philippines's right issued under UNCLOS.<sup>47</sup>

On July 12, 2016, the case was finalized with the release of the *Award*, which brought a significant victory that supported the Philippines original claim.<sup>48</sup> The *Award* includes the invalidation of the Nine-Dash Line and the denial of claiming EEZ through “islands” in the South China Sea which was concluded to be rocks based on the article of UNCLOS.<sup>49</sup> The court accepted historical background that Chinese fisherman went fishing within the area of the Nine-Dash Line, however, there was no evidence of dominance over the area.<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup> Maximo Paulino T. Sison, “Universalizing the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea Dispute,” *Ocean Development & International Law* 49, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 157–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2018.1442181>, 158.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid

<sup>48</sup> Ibid

<sup>49</sup> “PREAMBLE to the UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION on the LAW of the SEA,” [www.un.org](http://www.un.org), accessed March 9, 2022, [https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid





### **China's reaction**

Despite the fact that the judgement states that China's claim on the Nine-Dash Line does not hold a historical basis, China declared that they do not accept the outcome of the arbitration and they have been strengthening its political influence in the South China Sea through the illegal construction of artificial islands in the area and through deploying militaries on the sea.<sup>51</sup>

### **The Philippines' reaction**

Since Rodrigo Duterte, the current president of the Philippines, got elected in 2016 after the victory of the case, he has promoted the benefits the Philippines have in allying with China.<sup>52</sup> China agreed on investing billions of dollars in the Philippines in its infrastructures, which has not been finalized.<sup>53</sup>

In May 2021, the president of the Philippines stated that the *Award* is "a piece of paper" and that it is meaningless which has an intention to appeal to the friendly relations between the Philippines and China.<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 159

<sup>52</sup> Yen Nee Lee, "Four Years On, Philippine President Duterte Is Still Struggling to Show the Benefits of Being Pro-China," CNBC, September 8, 2020, <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/08/philippine-president-duterte-fails-to-produce-results-from-pro-china-stance.html>.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>54</sup> Devina Halim, "Arbitration Win over China Just a Piece of Paper: Philippines President," [www.aa.com.tr](http://www.aa.com.tr), May 6, 2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/arbitration-win-over-china-just-a-piece-of-paper-philippines-president/2231477>.



## Questions to Consider

1. Most of the territorial rights claimed by several countries in the South China Sea do not follow the definition of “islands” under UNCLOS. Should the international community consider tightening regulations of the claims for each state to respect the Article of UNCLOS?
2. One of the reasons for the long-lasting dispute is the overlapping of the claim because every state refuses to let go of the rights to claim EEZ and TS in the South China Sea. Should there be a new international marine law to regulate overlapping territorial claims between states?
3. The presence of vast maritime resources drives the states to claim EEZ within the South China Sea. Is there a way all states can manage to share the benefits of exploiting the resources with their neighbours to solve the dispute?
4. Trade passing through the SCS is extremely important for Asian countries. How can an international community come up with a trade route regulation that doesn't create another dispute?



## Country Descriptions

### Claimant Countries:

#### *China*

China seeks to control the entire South China Sea. It claims an area delimited by a “nine-dash line” which includes the entire sea and all its land features, all of which are in conflict with the claims of other states. China’s nine-dash line claim has been ruled invalid by the international court for being inconsistent with the United Nations Law of the Sea China (UNCLOS), but even though it is a signatory of the UNCLOS, China continues to consider its claim as a legitimate one, based on “historical records”. to gradually increase the presence of Chinese vessels in these contested regions with the goal to eventually fully control them. China does not consider any of the sovereign claims made by the other countries, and does not hesitate to periodically show them who owns these areas through force and threats. Another part of China’s strategy to assert its presence in the SCS is to “build” new islands where the water is shallow enough to allow for it. Controlling the SCS is an important objective for China as it represents one of the most important global maritime trade routes (it is estimated that one-third of global shipping passes through the SCS). It also contains great amounts of oil and natural gas reserves, making it an important source of energy that China can exploit. The SCS is also important to China for military purposes: controlling this territory would yield the country a great deal of power, not only because of its enormous size, but also because of its strategic, central location in South-East Asia and its many clusters of islands on which military outposts could be built. China is also an ally of Russia, both of which have a similar interest in claiming a neighbouring state (Ukraine for Russia,



Taiwan for China). Ties between these two countries are growing, as these two have started conducting their first joint patrols in the Western Pacific in 2021.<sup>55</sup>

### ***The Philippines***

The Philippines is probably the most active player after China in this dispute. Its main conflict is with China, whose regular military presence in what the Philippines considers its own integral territory greatly angers. The Philippines openly and regularly condemns China's actions in the SCS, and even went as far as to hold an international court on this dispute in 2016, where it was concluded that China had no right to claim its "nine-dash line" area on the basis of the UNCLOS, however, China did not change its strategy despite the order. The Philippines has filed 78 diplomatic protests to China since 2016! As recently as in February 2022, the president of the Philippines announced that he wants to bring military presence to the SCS, not to fire upon vessels but to defend its waters. He precised that he will not prioritize a military solution to the conflict, and will continue following a diplomatic approach with China. Indeed, being the weaker state in this conflict, the Philippines' strategy focuses on diplomacy and international law. Noteworthy however is that the Philippines is an ally of the U.S., which verbally supports the Philippines in this conflict. The SCS is important for the Philippines for its gas and oil industry, and fishing industry.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> "US wants to help Taiwan participate 'meaningfully' in UN, as China prepares to mark key anniversary," The Guardian, October 24, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/24/us-wants-to-help-taiwan-participate-meaningfully-in-un-as-china-prepares-to-mark-key-anniversary>

<sup>56</sup> "Philippines' Marcos wants military presence to defend its waters in South China Sea," Reuters, February 15, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-marcos-wants-military-presence-defend-its-waters-south-china-sea-2022-02-15/>



## ***Vietnam***

Vietnam is one of the key claimants in the South China Sea Dispute. Sovereignty and territorial integrity is sacred to the Vietnamese, especially considering its century history of external invasion and colonial dominance. Safeguarding its sovereignty is Vietnam's most important aspect in this issue. On the aspect of economy, Vietnam's most important concern is energy supply security, and the South China Sea sea bed's oil and natural gas reserves play a critical role in meeting its electricity demand. Vietnam seeks a peaceful resolution to this dispute, through negotiation and discussion. Vietnam's territorial claims overlapping with those of several other countries, a possible path that some Vietnam government officials are proposing is to acknowledge its islands as being "contested areas"; to use a more flexible understanding of sovereignty. Vietnam has a long history of successful resolutions of these types of maritime disputes with neighbouring countries, usually solving these using Joint Development Agreements (JDA), whereby two or more concerned countries agree to share exploitation of the resources of the contested territory. Unlike many other countries involved in the SCS dispute, Vietnam does not hesitate to openly criticize China when they intrude into their sovereign regions.<sup>57</sup>

## ***Indonesia***

Indonesia is primarily focused on guarding its own claims around the Natuna Islands, all the while not antagonizing China. Indeed, President Jokowi has little interest in regional

---

<sup>57</sup> Min Van Pham, "Vietnam and the South China Sea Dispute: Sovereign Claim, Energy Security and Joint Development Agreement," *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 1, no. 2 (2014): 51–69. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664005>.



## South China Sea Dispute

diplomacy despite increasing Chinese incursions around the Natunas. Part of the reason for this passive behaviour is explained by Jokowi's goal to receive funding from Chinese investors for his signature infrastructure projects. However, might China decide not to invest in Indonesia's infrastructure projects or become overly intruding in the Natuna region, there is a real possibility for a deterioration in the countries' relation. In which case, Indonesia could become more active in this issue, as it used to be under the previous presidency.<sup>58</sup>

### ***Taiwan***

Taiwan is an interesting case in this dispute, since it considers itself as an independent state, whilst China considers it as one of its provinces—and at the same time, it is also an ally of the USA (Taiwan thus has the possibility of being a key leverage between the USA and People's Republic of China). Nonetheless, Taiwan does have a claim of its own lying in the SCS: the Taiping Island, which is part of the Spratly Islands Archipelago. Taiwan has held a military base there which it maintains and occupies since 1956, in addition to meteorological search equipment. The claim over this island has resulted in conflicts with Vietnam particularly. It must be clarified that on paper only, Taiwan actually claims the same “nine-dash line” area outlined by China. This is done so to keep a good relationship with China, as it aids in legitimizing China's claim (from

---

<sup>58</sup> Aaron L. Connelly, “Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going it alone,” *Lowy Institute*, (December 2016), <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-south-china-sea-going-it-alone>.



China's perspective, Taiwan is one of its provinces). Indeed, Taiwan's priority is to keep a stable relationship with China and protect its mainland first and foremost.<sup>59,60</sup>

### **Malaysia**

Malaysia claims sovereignty over 10 atolls which all fall within its 200 nautical miles EEZ. Its claims overlap with China, the Philippines and Vietnam. The waters off these islands are economically important for their fisheries and particularly their natural gas reserves, since Malaysia is one of the world's biggest producers of it. As a small state, Malaysia is a strong upholder of international law, particularly the UNCLOS, and supports international arbitration as a means to resolve territorial conflicts. Malaysia's main conflict is with China, though it has experienced clashes with Vietnamese vessels. China's nine-dash line is not recognized by the Malaysian government as it is not in accordance with the UNCLOS. However, China being Malaysia's biggest economic partner, it is also a priority for the country to maintain this valuable economic relationship and thus Malaysia tends to avoid or deny the problem. Malaysia promotes peace and stability in the SCS. This is especially important for them since its economy is highly dependent on the free flow of maritime trade. While Malaysia believes in JDAs as a means to solve this type of issue, it is not seriously considering it, since its claims all lie in its EEZ anyway.

---

<sup>59</sup> Lynn Kuok, "Taiwan's evolving position in the South China Sea — and why other actors should take notice," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, May 15, 2022, <https://amti.csis.org/taiwans-evolving-position-in-the-south-china-sea-and-why-other-actors-should-take-notice/>.

<sup>60</sup> Ralph Jennings, "Taiwan Risks Beijing Backlash Over South China Sea Patrols," Voice of America, March 6, 2017, <https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-risks-beijing-backlash-south-china-sea-patrols/3751147.html>.



### ***Brunei***

Brunei, unlike the other parties involved in the dispute, does not occupy any islands in the SCS. Its claim consists of only one feature of the South China Sea: the Louisa Reef (part of the Spratly Islands Archipelago). Most of this feature remains submerged, with some portions emerging at low tide. Its claim overlaps with China's and Vietnam's. Brunei's economic reliance on China is such that it cannot allow itself to criticize it, and it is much more beneficial for it to cooperate with China. Brunei's access to the sea is important mostly for exploitation of the natural gas and oil reserves, since this represents the vast majority of its GDP.

### **Non-Claimant Countries:**

#### ***Japan***

Japan has no claims over any part of the South China Sea. Thus, it is not involved directly in this dispute. However, Japan is experiencing a very similar dispute currently in the East China Sea with China, where Japan claims the Senkaku Islands, and repeatedly accuses China of unrightfully entering the Senkaku Islands' surrounding territorial waters. As with Japan's relationship with the countries involved in the SCS, it has strong relations with Vietnam and The Philippines to whom it has supplied coast guard vessels and radar systems. Japan will do what it can to keep these economic and security ties with these countries. It is worried about China's territorial expansion but does not fear to oppose China's claims.<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>61</sup> Koda, Yoji. "Japan's Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea." National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), January 2016.





### ***South Korea***

South Korea does not seem to have a clear stance on the situation, but it would like to keep peace in the region. It has business partnerships with quite a few countries involved in the situation and probably would want to remain neutral in hopes of not ruining any ties.<sup>62</sup>

### ***The United States of America***

While The United States of America does not have any claim in the SCS, it does exert its presence there. It regularly conducts “Freedom of Navigation Acts” (FON) in the sea, in the goal of preserving the neutrality of these international waters and trying to stop China’s expanding control in the region. In this FON, they also conduct military exercises. This is something that angers China and something China would like to stop. In fact, China is looking to discuss with countries member of the ASEAN to develop a code of conduct regulating these practices in the sea. The United States fears China will provoke a situation that could lead to war. This is especially worrisome to the USA and its allies because of China’s enormous power in the world. The USA also has strong economic ties with many countries involved in the SCS dispute and is an ally to The Philippines, one of the key participants in this dispute.<sup>63</sup>

---

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905086#:~:text=After%20the%20end%20of%20the,%2C%20the%20Philippines%2C%20and%20Vietnam.>

<sup>62</sup> Jaehyon, Lee. “South Korea and the South China Sea.” National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), January 2016. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905087>.

<sup>63</sup> Swaine, Michael D. “America’s Security Role in the South China Sea.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 23, 2015. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/23/america-s-security-role-in-south-china-sea-pub-60826>.



### ***Russia***

As one of China's biggest allies, Russia has supported China's claim in the SCS. It has even practiced joint navy patrols along Chinese vessels in the region recently. However, at least publicly, Russia does not support a violent resolution to the SCS dispute but rather hopes to formulate a code of conduct capable of ending the dispute.<sup>64</sup>

### ***Canada***

Much like the USA, Canada wants to make sure the South China sea stays relatively calm. Canada has also conducted military exercises in this sea, alongside the US. In 2018, the Senate of Canada passed a motion condemning China's "increasing hostile behaviour" in the SCS, one of the rare times this country criticises China in such a direct way. Canada seeks a peaceful and stable solution to the problem.<sup>65</sup>

### ***Australia***

Much like the USA and Canada, Australia wants to make sure the South China sea stays relatively calm and has many ties with countries involved in the dispute. It sees China's overstepping and rule breaking of the international maritime laws as an extreme overstep and

---

<sup>64</sup> Kapoor, Nivedita. "Russia's Conduct in the South China Sea." ORF, June 18, 2021. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/russias-conduct-in-the-south-china-sea/>.

<sup>65</sup> Atkinson, G. F. "WHAT CAN CANADA DO? EXAMINING CANADA'S ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA," March 2021. <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/23/305/Atkinson.pdf>.



would want there to be consequences afflicted to China for their actions. Australia has also taken part in military exercises in the SCS alongside New Zealand, under Freedom of Navigation.<sup>66</sup>

### ***Thailand***

Due to Thailand's good relationship and economic ties with all the countries within the region, its position is more neutral in this conflict and takes on an important role of mediator and coordinator in the dispute and in meetings between ASEAN countries. Thailand wants to see peace in the region.<sup>67</sup>

### ***India***

India believes that the region should be a global common. It does not have any particularly important direct ties with any of the countries involved in the SCS dispute, but would gladly help out in peace talks if needed. Maintaining peace in the region is essential to India's economy, since half of all of the country's trade passes through the SCS. India strongly supports abidance to the international maritime laws. Like the Western countries mentioned earlier, India also conducted military exercises in the SCS.<sup>68</sup>

---

<sup>66</sup> Cook, Malcolm. "Australia's South China Sea Challenges." Lowy Institute. Lowy Institute, May 28, 2021. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-coming-south-china-sea-challenges>.

<sup>67</sup> China, Thailand exchange in-depth views on South China Sea issue. Accessed April 25, 2022. <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceth//eng/gdxw/t1638466.htm>.

<sup>68</sup> <https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/our-position-clear-we-are-for-freedom-of-navigation-through-south-china-sea-govt/544824/>



## ***Bibliography***

Atkinson, G. F. "WHAT CAN CANADA DO? EXAMINING CANADA'S ROLE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA," March 2021. <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/23/305/Atkinson.pdf>.

Blaxland, John. "What Happened When a Chinese Ship Shone a Laser at an Australian Plane – and Why Does It Matter?" The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, February 21, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/feb/21/what-happened-when-a-chinese-ship-shone-a-laser-at-an-australian-plane-and-why-does-it-matter>.

Borger, Julian. "Race to Salvage US F-35C Fighter Jet That Crashed in Hostile South China Sea." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, January 28, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/28/f-35c-crash-leaves-us-fighter-jet-sunken-in-hostile-south-china-sea>.

"Chapter 2: Maritime Zones – Law of the Sea." Tufts.edu, 2017. <https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-two/>.

Churchill, R. R. "Law of the Sea | International Law [1982] | Britannica." In *Encyclopædia Britannica*, February 7, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Law-of-the-Sea>.

China, Thailand exchange in-depth views on South China Sea issue. Accessed March 27, 2022. <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceth//eng/gdxw/t1638466.htm>.

Cook, Malcolm. "Australia's South China Sea Challenges." Lowy Institute. Lowy Institute, May 28, 2021. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-coming-south-china-sea-challenges>.



Connelly, Aaron L. "Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going it alone," *Lowy Institute* (December 2016). <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-south-china-sea-going-it-alone>.

Faesal, Major Almannai. "WHY CHINA BUILT in the SOUTH CHINA SEA," May 2019. <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/308/305/almannai.pdf>.

Graphics, WSJ com News. "The South China Sea Dispute." *The Wall Street Journal*, July 12, 2016. <http://graphics.wsj.com/south-china-sea-dispute/>.

Halim, Devina. "Arbitration Win over China Just a Piece of Paper: Philippines President." [www.aa.com.tr](http://www.aa.com.tr), May 6, 2021. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/arbitration-win-over-china-just-a-piece-of-paper-phil>

Jaehyon, Lee. "South Korea and the South China Sea." *National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)*, January 2016. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905087>. [ippines-president/2231477](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905087).

Jennings, Ralph. "Taiwan Risks Beijing Backlash Over South China Sea Patrols." *Voice of America*, March 6, 2017. <https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-risks-beijing-backlash-south-china-sea-patrols/3751147.html>.

Kapoor, Nivedita. "Russia's Conduct in the South China Sea." *ORF*, June 18, 2021. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/russias-conduct-in-the-south-china-sea/>.

Koda, Yoji. "Japan's Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea." *National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)*, January 2016. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905086#:~:text=After%20the%20end%20of%20the,%2C%20the%20Philippines%2C%20and%20Vietnam.>



## South China Sea Dispute

Kuok, Lynn. "Taiwan's evolving position in the South China Sea — and why other actors should take notice," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, May 15, 2022.

<https://amti.csis.org/taiwans-evolving-position-in-the-south-china-sea-and-why-other-actors-should-take-notice/>.

Lee, Yen Nee. "Four Years On, Philippine President Duterte Is Still Struggling to Show the Benefits of Being Pro-China." CNBC, September 8, 2020.

<https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/08/philippine-president-duterte-fails-to-produce-results-from-pro-china-stance.html>.

Ma, Xuechan. "The South China Sea Dispute: Perspective of International Law." *Atlantisch Perspectief* 40, no. 3 (2016): 39–41. <https://doi.org/10.2307/48581297>.

Macaraig, Christine Elizabeth, and Adam James Fenton. "Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation." *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 8, no. 2 (2021): 42–58.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340>.

"Maritime Zone | InforMEA." [www.informea.org](http://www.informea.org), n.d.

<https://www.informea.org/en/terms/maritime-zone>.

"More than 30% of Global Maritime Crude Oil Trade Moves through the South China Sea."

Eia.gov, August 27, 2018. <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36952>.

Pham, Min Van. "Vietnam and the South China Sea Dispute: Sovereign Claim, Energy Security and Joint Development Agreement." *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 1, no. 2 (2014): 51–69. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664005>.



“Philippines' Marcos wants military presence to defend its waters in South China Sea.” Reuters, February 15, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-marcos-wants-military-presence-defend-its-waters-south-china-sea-2022-02-15/>.

“PREAMBLE to the UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION on the LAW of the SEA.” www.un.org. Accessed March 9, 2022. [https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm).

“PRESS RELEASE the SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION (the REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES v. the PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC of CHINA).” Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 2016. <https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf>.

“Satellite Images Show China Has Built Mock-Ups of US Warships.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, November 8, 2021. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/08/satellite-images-china-mock-ups-us-warships>.

Sison, Maximo Paulino T. “Universalizing the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea Dispute.” *Ocean Development & International Law* 49, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 157–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2018.1442181>.

Storey, Ian. “Malaysia and the South China Sea Dispute: Policy Continuity amid Domestic Political Change.” *The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies* 2020, no. 18 (March 2020). <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/malaysia-and-the-south-china-sea-dispute-policy-continuity-amid-domestic-political-change-by-ian-storey/>.

Swaine, Michael D. “America's Security Role in the South China Sea.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 23, 2015.



## South China Sea Dispute

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/23/america-s-security-role-in-south-china-sea-pub-60826>.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Strait of Malacca | Strait, Asia | Britannica." In *Encyclopædia Britannica*, June 20, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Strait-of-Malacca>.

———. "Territorial Waters | International Law | Britannica." In *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/territorial-waters>.

"Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea | Global Conflict Tracker." 2022. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea>.

"UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION on the LAW of the SEA." Un.org, 2020. [https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm](https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm).

"US wants to help Taiwan participate 'meaningfully' in UN, as China prepares to mark key anniversary." The Guardian, October 24, 2021. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/24/us-wants-to-help-taiwan-participate-meaningfully-in-un-as-china-prepares-to-mark-key-anniversary>.

Van, Aaron. "Artificial Islands in South China Sea." ArcGIS StoryMaps, December 9, 2020. <https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/6d8a684e762f4f4ca90c1a19121fcf8c>.

Zhiguo Gao, and Bing Bing Jia. "The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications." *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 107, no. 1, [American Society of International Law, Cambridge University Press], 2013, pp. 98–124, <https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.1.0098>.

